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Abstract
This paper analyses the continuities and changes in water management in the Olifants basin after the first decade of imple-
mentation of the National Water Act (1998). By taking a historical perspective of the basin development trajectory, the paper 
shows how the White minority rulers, who exerted power until 1994, systematically denied historically disadvantaged indi-
viduals (HDIs) the right to become significant water users, let alone ‘economically viable’ water users. In contrast, White 
water users undertook major water resource development, which, by the 1970s resulted in the emergence of a ‘White water 
economy’. Under the new dispensation (post-1994), the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) took a two-
pronged approach in the Olifants basin and elsewhere for redressing the inequities of the past. On the one hand, from the 
central top down, it opened up the ‘White water economy’ into a water economy serving especially ‘economically viable 
water users’, who rapidly ceased to be White only. As reflected in a range of new measures taken in the Olifants basin, in this 
new water economy DWAF better targets bulk domestic supplies to HDIs, has more public participation, and is strengthening 
its regulatory role in terms of cost-recovery, environmental issues, and pollution prevention. On the other hand DWAF seeks 
to fill the enormous backlog in water services delivery to HDIs, not only for domestic water uses, but increasingly also for 
productive uses. The major challenge of bottom-up coordinated service delivery for multiple uses through the newly estab-
lished Provincial and Local Governments and the transforming line agencies is addressed under the recently launched Water 
for Growth and Development Initiative.
Keywords: water policy, water law, history, basin management, livelihoods, poverty, gender, Olifants basin, 
South Africa
Introduction
The Olifants basin is one of the two HELP basins in South Africa. 
The basin stretches from the small eastern part of Gauteng Prov-
ince, via the western and middle part of Mpumalanga Province to 
the southern part of Limpopo Province into the Kruger National 
Park, before the Olifants River flows into Mozambique. Mean 
annual rainfall is in the range of 500 mm to 800 mm over most 
of the basin with wide annual and spatial variations (NWRS, 
2004a). In order to mitigate these climatic vagaries, most water 
resources in the basin have been developed and competition for 
water among small rural users, urban users, mines, industries, 
large-scale agriculture, forestry, and eco-tourism is among the 
strongest in South Africa. 
 In spite of the high level of water development, poverty is 
widespread among the population of 2.5 million inhabitants and 
32% of all households in the basin have no income at all. The 
annual incomes of another 30% of the households are less than 
1 US$ (approximately ZAR 8.00) per day (SSA, 2003; Magagula, 
2006). Former homelands constitute only 26% of the area but 
house 60% of the population, all Africans. Africans constitute 
94% and Coloureds and Indians 1% of the population. Whites are 
a minority of 5% (Magagula, 2007). In this paper on the Oli fants 
basin, the expression ‘Historically Disadvantaged Individuals’ 
(HDIs) mainly refers to Africans. Inequities in the distribution 
of water use are extreme. Over 95% of the water resources are 
controlled by only 0.5% of the population (Cullis and Van Kop-
pen, 2007). Hardly any of the HDIs has a water entitlement in 
his or her name. Indeed, the key water challenge in this basin, 
as in many other basins in South Africa, is the improvement of 
the livelihoods of all, among others through stronger legal and 
realised water entitlements.
 This challenge is recognised by the South African Govern-
ment, including its Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF). Redressing the inequities of the past and poverty eradi-
cation are enshrined in the new Constitution (RSA, 1996). They 
are also the overarching objectives of the Water Services Act 
(1997) and the National Water Act (NWA) (1998). The formula-
tion and promulgation of this widely renowned piece of water 
legislation were part and parcel of the broader watershed changes 
in South Africa since the first democratic elections in 1994.
 After one decade of implementation of the Water Services 
Act and National Water Act in the Olifants basin, trends are 
emerging. As argued in this paper, these trends become consid-
erably more visible by taking a historical perspective. History 
explains causes of the legacy of widespread poverty and inequi-
ties in access to water in the Olifants basin, as inherited from the 
past, and better highlights both the continuities and the changes 
overtime. The aim of this paper is to provide such analysis of the 
pre- and post-1994 ‘basin development trajectory’ (Molle, 2003). 
The analysis is based on a literature review and interviews with 
policy makers, legislators, scientists, implementers, civil soci-
ety, and the range of water users in the basin, including the poor, 
throughout this first decade of implementation.  In the following, 
the history is addressed first before proceeding to the post-1994 
era. Geographical sites are indicated by their current names. 
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 Map 1 shows the Olifants basin and its four sub-basins. It 
shows the extensive water transfers into the Upper Olifants sub-
basin, adjacent to Gauteng, underlining how important develop-
ments outside the Olifants basin have been. 
The Olifants Basin development trajectory 
pre-1994 
Dispossession
Three partly overlapping historical processes can be distin-
guished that explain the inequities in access to water and water 
entitlements at the dawn of democracy. The first process is the 
dispossession of Africans of their land, water, and mineral 
resources (Van Rheenen, 1925; Lewis 1934; O’Meara, 1983; 
Delius, 1983; Sparks, 1990; Backeberg, 1994; Thompson, 2001; 
Terreblanche, 2002). Originally, the Olifants basin was inhab-
ited by agro-pastoralist Africans, the Sotho-speaking baSotho 
and baTswana and N’guni speaking N’debele, Swazis, and Tson-
gas. From the 1830s onwards, the Afrikaner ‘Boers’ started 
encroaching the area. They were agro-pastoralists and traders, 
among other in ivory (from the many elephants that gave the Oli-
fants basin its Afrikaner name for ‘elephant’. Its African name 
of Lepelle means ‘the river that meanders slowly along’ (Bulpin, 
1956)). From the 1860s onwards, some gold and diamonds were 
discovered in the Olifants basin, but much larger reserves were 
found in the adjacent Witwatersrand area in Johannesburg. This 
discovery incited the British mining and financing houses, sup-
ported by their motherland’s imperial army, to annex the Boers 
and, together with the Boers, to subject all African chieftaincies 
with brutal violence. The defeat of chief Sekhukhune in 1879 
marked this subjugation. Virtually all land was ‘lawfully’ appro-
priated by Whites through the British administrative land title 
deed system. Africans were relegated to ‘Locations’, the later 
Reserves and homelands.
 In 1910 the elite ‘alliance of maize (Afrikaner landlords) 
and gold (British mining houses and financing corporations)’ 
established the Union of South Africa. This economic-political-
military constellation, which continued largely unaltered when 
South Africa became a Republic in 1961 and lasted up till 1994, 
denied the vote to virtually all HDIs. The Land Act of 1913 ‘law-
fully’ dispossessed Africans of 91% of their land, slightly lim-
iting to 87% under the Land Act of 1936. The latter Act also 
further eroded tenants’ status in White-owned farms to the most 
exploited wage labour force. The same dispossession occurred 
with regard to water resources. The Irrigation and Conserva-
tion Act of 1912 adopted the riparian rights principle, which ties 
rights in perpetuity to land ownership in White areas. This dis-
possessed Africans also from the land-related water resources 
with one stroke of the pen. A battery of ‘draconian’ labour regu-
lations, including Master and Servant Acts, anti-unionisation 
acts, and pass laws, further subjugated Africans into an ultra-
exploited labour force for the White economy.
 In this indirect divide-and-rule mode of territorial and 
institutional segregation, ‘Pretoria’ appointed ally chiefs in the 
Native Reserves, whose accountability became upwards instead 
of downwards to their constituencies as before this ‘retribali-
sation’. The apartheid regime consolidated these Reserves as 
homelands through massive forced removals. In 1973, those 
with a Sotho surname, such as the Pedi, were moved to Lebowa. 
The supposed Tshwana were formally relocated into Bophut-
hatswana, one patch of which was adjacent to KwaNdebele 
in the Olifants basin. The N’debele in the Olifants basin, who 
had largely been living on White farms and in the urbanising 
and industrialising areas in the Upper Olifants sub-basin, got a 
new homeland: KwaNdebele. The Shangaan were placed near 
Mozambique, in the homeland of Gazankulu, at the eastern bor-
der of Lebowa. It is this ‘lawful’ dispossession of land, water, 
and mineral resources that explains why up till today hardly any 
of the HDIs in the Olifants basin (or elsewhere in South Africa) 
have formal water entitlements in their names.
The White hydraulic mission
The second process, ‘the White hydraulic mission’, explains the 
legacy of inequities in factual access to water and also shows 
the importance of state investments in water to steer patterns of 
agricultural growth. Water provision for White mining, electric-
ity generation, urbanisation, and later industrialisation started 
localised and was often self-financed, also through local munici-
palities. However, for agriculture, the minority state was pivotal. 
From 1917 till 1994, the Irrigation Department and, after 1956, 
Map 1
Interbasin transfers in and out 
the four Olifants sub-basins 
(Source: DWAF, NWRS, 
2004a)
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the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) provided technical sup-
port and very soft loans or grants to 17 newly created Irrigation 
Boards in the basin. In many cases this support included dam 
construction. After 1946, private farmers could also obtain sub-
sidies. Moreover, in the 1930s the country’s first two Govern-
ment Water Schemes were built in the Olifants basin to settle 
White farmers: the Rust-der-Winter Scheme started in 1929 and 
the Loskop Scheme in 1934. This consolidated encroachment 
of the White minority in remote rural areas. Moreover, it qui-
eted the political unrest of the dissatisfied ‘poor Whites’ many of 
whom had flocked to the urbanising centres where they competed 
with African wage workers with much lower wages (Backe berg, 
1994; Terreblanche, 2002; Turton and Meissner, 2003).
 Agricultural and irrigation support to Whites destroyed Afri-
can farming even further. When the maize markets emerged at 
the end of the 19th century, Africans, as traditional crop farmers, 
responded more vibrantly to these new opportunities than Afri-
kaner absentee landlords or agro-pastoralists. However, grow-
ing market competition by heavily subsidised White farmers’ 
products compounded erosion of resource rights and degrading 
tenancy arrangements on White farms to such an extent that this 
ended the ‘Black peasant road to capitalism’ (Crais, 1992, cited 
in Terreblanche, 2002). Women as the traditional crop cultiva-
tors in the Native Reserves suffered most from this competi-
tion. Their output remained just sufficient to ‘justify’ even lower 
wages for males in their productive ages and saved the state any 
expenditure for raising the new generation of labourers, car-
ing for the sick, and hosting the pensioners (Van Koppen et al., 
2006). In probably no other era or country did state water policy 
influence the pattern of economic growth more than in pre-1994 
agrarian South Africa. 
  Mining with its largely self-financed water provision was 
taken up in all four sub-basins since the late 19th century. In the 
Upper Olifants sub-basin, coal was mined, which triggered the 
establishment of steam-driven electricity generation by the par-
astatal Electricity Supply Commission (Escom) in 1919. Cheap 
energy stimulated manufacturing and, in 1950, the establishment 
of the South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) 
and other petro-industries. In the mineral-rich Bushveld Igneous 
Complex in the Middle Olifants and Steelpoort sub-basins, the 
mining corporations started mining of platinum, asbestos, and 
many other minerals. Lastly, in Phalaborwa in the Lower Oli-
fants sub-basin, just before the Olifants River enters the Kruger 
National Park, copper and phosphorus were mined.
The White water economy
The third process that shaped the legacy of the past started 
around the 1970s. A ‘White water economy’ emerged that 
focused on the construction and management of increasingly 
larger bulk infrastructure within and across basins and even 
across countries. The booming industrialisation and urbanisa-
tion since the 1960s in Gauteng and the adjacent Upper Olifants 
sub-basin warranted more and higher-security water. 
 Yet, on this elevated Highveld (from the east, the land rises 
over a mountainous escarpment towards the interior plateau 
known as the Highveld) only basins’ headwaters were available. 
In 1974, the first water transfer into the Upper Olifants sub-basin 
was constructed. Increasingly complex inter-basin networks of 
pumping stations, reservoirs, canals, pipes and tunnels linked 
the Upper Olifants sub-basin further with the Vaal, Usutu, 
Tukela, and Inkomati basins. In the 1980s, planning for tapping 
the highest water tower in the region, Lesotho, was started. The 
two governments and the private sector established an independ-
ent authority for the Lesotho Highland Project: the Trans-Cale-
don Tunnel Authority (TCTA). Financing was ‘off-budget’ from 
Treasury through a commercial loan of ZAR 10 billion (2000 
prices) from the World Bank and other financiers. Apparently, 
these bankers were confident about the ability and willingness 
to pay of these economically viable water users.
 Within the Olifants basin boundaries, the scale of infrastruc-
ture projects also became larger after the 1970s. In the Upper 
Olifants sub-basin, new large-scale water supplies provided 
water to KwaNdebele for domestic uses, besides White irriga-
tion and mining (McCartney et al., 2004). In the Middle-Olif-
ants sub-basin, the Flag Boshielo Dam was constructed in 1987 
to ensure dry-season water storage for the growing number of 
mines in the area, for the municipal water needs of Polokwane 
town, and for irrigation immediately downstream of the dam. 
The planning for future pipes and dams was initiated. In the 
Lower Olifants sub-basin, the Blydepoort Dam was constructed 
in 1975 for White irrigators immediately downstream and the 
Phalaborwa mines much further downstream. 
 The higher costs of moving water from less favourable dam 
sites over greater distances, especially to elevated Gauteng war-
ranted new notions of water resources management.  This was 
first articulated by the Commission of Enquiry into Water Mat-
ters in 1970. Agriculture lost its favoured position. The construc-
tion of Government Water Schemes was ended and subsidies 
were challenged – although they continued in reality. This coin-
cided with the agricultural transition and deregulation of agri-
culture within the colonial economy. Many White farmers had 
found better jobs in the industrialising economy. The remainder 
farms became highly mechanised and their sizes increased to an 
average of 808 ha (Mpumalanga Province) and 972 ha (Limpopo 
Province) (Fényes and Meyer, 2003). The irrigated area in the 
Olifants basin increased from 73 638 ha in 1965-1973 (DWAF, 
1991) to 128 021 ha in 1995 (McCartney et al., 2004). 
 In the new philosophy, water was more and more seen as an 
economic good. The 1970 Commission reminded the repeated 
calls since the 1950s for economic tools: volume-based pay-
ment, sliding scales, and intra-scheme water trade for irriga-
tion. Also, long before the Dublin Principles of 1991, notions 
emerged of virtual water and inter-scheme water trade accord-
ing to the water’s highest value: ‘The application of a realistic 
price policy that reflects underlying scarcities is one of the most 
efficient ways of ensuring the effective exploitation of a coun-
try’s resources. In a free economy it is moreover the best way of 
effecting a balance between supply and demand and preventing 
waste of a scarce commodity’ (DWA, 1970). Furthermore, the 
urgency to implement ‘the user pays’ principle became stronger 
with reducing state funding when apartheid South Africa was 
confronted by economic stagflation, international boycotts and 
high state spending on the police and military to suppress the 
immense political protest within and outside South Africa. In the 
1980s the then Department of Water Affairs (DWA) appointed 
its first accountants to ensure the factual repayment of loans. 
 Private engineering firms and consultants also came up with 
certain specialisations. The consultancy firm BKS specialised 
on the Olifants basin, for example. This organised fraternity 
claimed an important role for themselves according to DWA 
(1986): ‘Except to the extent that it is necessary for security, stra-
tegic and practical reasons, the detailed design, construction and 
maintenance activities should be undertaken by the private sec-
tor’. According to this private sector, DWA should limit itself to 
‘those functions that are not economically viable or that achieve 
greater public benefits in the absence of commercial interests’ 
(DWA, 1986). 
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 Under these changes, the role of DWA also shifted. Besides 
sharing in constructing, operating and maintaining the new bulk 
infrastructure alongside private players, DWA took up the cen-
tralised coordination and long-term planning of bulk supplies. 
Obviously, this occurred by taking the basin as unit of planning, 
but unlike much of the later global debates, with the purpose 
to move water in and out of those basins and out of other coun-
tries. A voluminous study was made on the Olifants basin as 
well (DWA, 1991). DWA also took up regulatory roles. As men-
tioned above, in order to reduce water uptake for irrigation (and 
repay loans) demand management through water pricing, slid-
ing scales and trade were proposed. To save state funds, transfer 
of irrigation management was stimulated. Industrial pollution 
problems were also recognised. In the Upper Olifants sub-basin 
in particular, concerns were growing about the massive volumes 
of groundwater in abandoned coal mine shafts that had turned 
acid and gypsiferous. The apartheid government was also a glo-
bal front-runner in recognising the ‘environment’ as a water 
user in its own right. In 1970, the ‘environment’ was defined 
as the Kruger National Park in the Olifants basin and St. Lucia 
wetlands. By 1986, some 300 small White-controlled public and 
private nature reserves were added. Their water needs were esti-
mated to require 13% of the total nation’s water demand (DWA, 
1986). In any case, the drastic changes since the 1970s had ren-
dered the 1956 Water Act with its many amendments outdated. 
An entirely new Act was needed (DWA, 1986).
Deepening exclusion of HDIs
The new notions of water as an economic good and economic 
viability as yardstick for fund and water allocation were pro-
moted as blanket policies in ‘the best national interest’ of ‘the 
free national economy’. This only disguised how it excluded 
HDIs even further.
 In KwaNdebele, townships and in rural areas governed by 
co-opted chiefs, some mediocre public support was provided 
for domestic water supplies. In the face of the growing politi-
cal protests in townships and payment boycotts because of weak 
service delivery, DWA recognised: ‘Affordability is sometimes 
an important consideration in the allocation of the full cost of 
domestic supplies. This is particularly the case for the largest 
and fastest growing sector of the community, which generally 
has yet to advance from Third World economic conditions and 
which, in part, cannot afford the true cost of supplies to meet 
basic human needs’ (DWA, 1986). 
 The ‘Betterment policies’ since the 1950s had supported the 
establishment of some 71 smallholder irrigation schemes in the 
homelands of the Olifants basin (Houghton, 1956; Denison and 
Manona, 2007). Yet, these and many unrecorded irrigation ini-
tiatives were not supposed to really compete with ‘economically 
viable White farming’. As DWA stated: ‘Irrigation development 
is often seen as an important first step in uplifting relatively 
undeveloped communities, but irrigation development is only 
one, and not necessarily the most effective, means of achieving 
socio-economic objectives’. ‘Since economic advantage is the 
decisive criterion for successful irrigation, the actual cost of all 
inputs must be taken into account and proposed projects must be 
tested against strict efficiency norms’. Moreover, to protect the 
White markets: ‘Besides the claims made on water of common 
interest and capital resources, the influence of irrigation on the 
balance between the demand and supply of agricultural products 
should also be taken into account’ (DWA, 1986). 
 In sum, Africans were never meant to become significant 
water users, let alone ‘economically viable’ water users who 
would be able compete with Whites, whether on agricultural or 
water markets. Instead, the 1970s implied that the last favourable 
dam sites were taken up and any new water claim by HDIs had 
now to face a new user with stronger rights: ‘the environment’, 
as defined by White technocrats. Requests for factual financial 
support were downplayed by the new criterion of ‘lack of eco-
nomic viability’. 
 The 1970s and especially the 1980s also saw the grow-
ing mass movements against the apartheid regime. The highly 
mechanised capital-intensive White economy started shedding 
increasingly larger parts of the population into unemploy-
ment, which added to its lack of legitimacy. In 1980, when the 
water planners argued for highest assurance of water supply to 
SASOL, this very symbol of the White economy was blown up 
by the underground military wing of the ANC (Saunders and 
Southey, 1998). National and international protests and boycotts 
against the racist apartheid regime made the country ungovern-
able and led to the negotiated settlement for democracy in the 
world’s ‘last nation’.
 Under the new dispensation, the mission of the state changed 
radically from serving a small formal and well-organised White 
constituency to serving an entire nation of over 40 million citi-
zens, deeply divided by wealth differences and territorial and 
institutional segregation. The despised homeland government 
structures were dismantled, although tribal chiefs maintained 
strong powers, in particular over communal land allocation. An 
entirely new nation-wide formal governance structure was set 
up. Provincial Government was established in nine new prov-
inces. In 2000, Municipalities were demarcated, crossing former 
homeland boundaries and new provincial boundaries. The Oli-
fants basin encompasses (parts of) 29 municipalities. In the 
efforts of the new Department of Water and Forestry to redress 
inequities from the past, two complementary approaches can be 
distinguished. The first is the opening up and gradual democra-
tisation of the White water economy, initiated from the central 
level. The second approach focuses on factual water services 
delivery, mainly through the emerging Local and Provincial 
Government and line agencies. The following range of changes 
in the White water economy and in water services delivery 
post-1994 in South Africa in general and in the Olifants basin 
in particular is not exhaustive but serves to illustrate emerging 
patterns. 
Redressing inequities of the past post-1994
Democratisation of the White water economy 
One change in the White water economy throughout the country 
was that, with the growing Black middle-class, the water eco-
nomy rapidly became less White-dominated, in terms of both 
clients and water professionals. These new clients were gener-
ally the ‘economically viable’ water users who could afford to 
pay water bills. 
 Second, subsidies to large-scale agriculture were factually 
reduced (which did not hamper self-initiated irrigation expansion, 
though).
 Third, while the plans of the 1980s for bulk infrastructure 
development, operation and maintenance were largely pursued 
as foreseen, there were also changes. The new bulk schemes 
were directed more at providing domestic supplies. Within the 
Upper Olifants sub-basin, new water supply was constructed for 
domestic purposes to the former KwaNdebele homeland, and 
to surrounding industrialising and irrigation areas. More water 
kept coming from the Vaal-system. A pipe was constructed from 
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the Vaal to SASOL and Eskom, and another pipeline to deliver 
water for domestic uses. 
 Dam development also became more participatory. In the 
Middle- and Steelpoort sub-basins, water provision for min-
ing accelerated through one integrated program: the Olifants 
River Water Resource Development Programme. This included 
a pipeline from the Olifants River to mining ventures in the 
Steelpoort basin; the raising of the Flag Boshielo Dam by 5 m; 
a pipeline from the Flag Boshielo Dam to mines in the adja-
cent basin; and, last but not least, the large De Hoop Dam in the 
Steelpoort area (DWAF, 2004b). These projects will make water 
available through off-takes and reservoirs for community water 
supply (DWAF, 2005), but the high price of this water is prohibi-
tive. Public participation took place, also for the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA). The approval accommodated appeals 
by the Kruger National Park and four NGOs – who insisted on 
the implementation of the Ecological Reserve.
 A 4th change, nation-wide, was a more rigorous implementa-
tion of the ‘user pays’ principle. A central registration system for 
billing, the Water Authorisation and Registration Management 
System (WARMS), was set up. In the Olifants basin, some 1 700 
users (who often have more allocations) were registered. Two 
national pricing strategies were promulgated in 1999 and 2005 
for Water Use charges, Water Resources Management charges 
and Waste Discharge charges. 
 Fifth, ‘the environment’ became a highly protected water 
user in its own rights. In the Olifants basin, the ‘Ecological 
Reserve’ was set at 460Mm3/a out of a natural mean annual run-
off (MAR) of 2 042 Mm3/a (NWRS, 2004b), or 23%. This ren-
dered the Olifants basin over-allocated. The basic human needs 
component of the Reserve for 25 ℓ/cap·d for a population of 
2.5 million is 23 Mm3/a, which is 1% of the MAR of 2 040 Mm3/a. 
 A 6th change brought about more rigorous pollution preven-
tion, besides the mentioned waste discharge charge. To remedy 
the acidification of groundwater in coal-mining shafts, DWAF 
promoted ‘controlled releases’ since the early 1990s. For new 
mines, pollution prevention was tied to new licences. In 2004, 
DWAF launched an ‘Integrated Water Resources Management 
Plan for the Upper and Middle Olifants’ (DWAF, 2004c). 
 Seventh, the Olifants became the 2nd pilot project in the 
country, after the Inkomati, to establish a proposal for a catch-
ment management agency (CMA), from 1999 to 2002 (Ligthelm, 
2001). Small-scale water users in the former homelands were 
explicitly included in the deliberations (DWAF, 2003a). The 
resulting proposal was shelved, awaiting the lessons from early 
CMAs elsewhere, in particular the adjacent Inkomati basin, and 
national debates on institutional alignment in the water sector. 
Related to this were some (ineffective) efforts to transform Irri-
gation Boards into more equitable Water Users Associations 
(Faysse, 2004). More recent initiatives are to cluster WUAs. 
 The public participation of stakeholders from the Olifants 
basin in the formulation of the National Water Resources Strat-
egy from 2002 to 2004, as prescribed by the NWA formed the 8th 
change. Internal Strategic Perspectives for each basin, including 
the Olifants basin, constituted its components (DWAF, 2004a; 
2004b). 
 Lastly, there were new civil society initiatives. In 1993 the 
Olifants River Forum was initiated by environmentally con-
cerned representatives of the downstream Phalaborwa mines 
and the Kruger National Park. The aim of this (still largely 
White commercial) basin-wide forum is to pursue ‘the health of 
the Olifants River’. 
 A common denominator of all these changes is that today’s 
water economy of economically viable water users is less race-
based and, thanks to DWAF’s extensive efforts to achieve wide 
stakeholders’ involvement, much more open than before 1994. 
Regulatory imperatives of cost-recovery with sound account-
ancy and effective pollution remedies and environmental 
flows are widely recognised, but enforcement appears to be a 
tall order. However, the beneficiaries have largely remained 
those who already benefited in the past and to a lesser extent 
the upcoming Black middle-class. For example, by 2006, out of 
the 1 212 licences issued nation-wide in terms of the Act since 
1998, only 26 (2%) were for the HDIs (who constitute 91% of 
the total population). Moreover, investments in water provision 
on the basis of cost-recovery and economic viability rendered 
resource-strapped Local Governments hesitant to spend their 
grants on domestic water services. If economic viability and 
cost-recovery are taken as criteria for investments in productive 
uses, the large majority of HDIs remains as excluded as before. 
In sum, the White water economy has definitely opened up, but 
is hardly democratised as yet. 
Water services delivery
The 2nd approach for redressing inequities from the past focuses 
on factual water services delivery to HDIs to overcome the enor-
mous backlogs in access to water. The single most important 
challenge is the creation of effective service delivery structures 
after the apartheid structures had been abolished, especially in 
the former homelands, where 60% of the population in the Olif-
ants basin lives. 
 Till the mid-2000s, virtually all water service delivery was 
focused on domestic water supplies. This utmost priority for 
domestic water services and sanitation was enshrined in the 
Water Services Act (1997) (RSA, 1997). Government’s top pri-
ority was to bring, for free, 25 ℓ/cap·d within 200 m from the 
house to all citizens (implying that higher consumption needed 
to be paid). DWAF itself temporarily filled the institutional void 
for service delivery as regional DWAF offices took over all 
ex-homeland schemes and its technical staff. Access to domestic 
water supplies improved considerably between the mid-1990s 
and mid-2000s, at least according to the design parameters 
of the infrastructure that was financed (which is considerably 
higher than actual end-use). Access to water improved from 59% 
of the population in 1994 to 79% for Mpumalanga and 72% in 
Limpopo Province in 2005. Similarly, access to basic sanitation 
services improved to 59% in Mpumalanga but only 37% in Lim-
popo (DWAF, 2006a). Preparing for hand-over of this service-
delivery function to Local Government in 2006, the shifting role 
of DWAF to one of regulation and support was enshrined in the 
Water Services Strategic Framework, approved in 2003 (DWAF, 
2003b). The young Local Governments by that time received 
considerable subsidies through equity schemes, and after 2004, 
municipal infrastructure grants. Planning for this service deliv-
ery was designed to be bottom-up through Integrated Develop-
ment Plans by municipalities and Provincial Growth and Devel-
opment Strategies and Water Sector Development Plans by 
provinces. All plans should contribute to the nationally defined 
economic strategies. The overarching Governmental Relations 
Framework Act of 2005 stipulated these cooperative require-
ments further.
 This temporary arrangement through DWAF cushioned the 
hurdles of the institutional transition from territorial and institu-
tional segregation to nation-wide democratic government deliv-
ery structures. However, the hurdles could not be avoided. Since 
hand-over, confusion about responsibilities has affected service 
provision, leading to the vicious circle of lesser performance, 
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so lesser incentive to pay or otherwise contribute to mainte-
nance (Ladki et al., 2004; Post-Uiterweer et al., 2006). There 
are cases in which delivery performance has dropped below the 
levels of the apartheid era. Also, municipalities’ engagement in 
water as a business tends to favour, again, income-generating 
sale of water rather than an holistic endeavour of support for 
the most appropriate technologies, e.g. mechanised pumps, 
homestead wells, rainwater and run-off harvesting, etc. As the 
25 ℓ/cap·d was strictly meant to be used for domestic purposes 
only, productive water needs were ignored, initially.
 Service delivery for productive water uses was more prob-
lematic and lacked any temporary cushion. When the new Pro-
vincial Department of Agriculture in Limpopo Province took 
formal responsibility for the smallholder irrigation schemes, it 
withdrew all existing financial and technical support of the apart-
heid era for smallholder irrigation. As a result, many schemes 
partially or fully collapsed. In 2004 the Provincial Department 
of Agriculture launched a massive project, namely Revitalisa-
tion of Smallholder Irrigation Schemes (RESIS) to rehabilitate 
126 schemes in Limpopo Province (also outside the Olifants 
basin) covering about 19 730 ha for 12 432 farmers (Shaker, 
2005). The opportunities offered by smallholder irrigation for 
poverty eradication through broad-based economic growth were 
underlined: ‘While mining provides 8 jobs/ZAR1m. invested, 
agriculture provides 40 to 50 jobs/ZAR1m. invested’ (Shaker, 
2005). However, by 2005 pressures to spend development budg-
ets grew and the focus shifted to larger-scale ‘farming as an 
economically viable business’ (Magadzi, 2005). A similar move 
towards larger-scale business-like farming according to the sole 
yardstick of ‘economic viability’ was observed elsewhere in the 
national policies of the Department of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs, and also in land reform (Lahiff, 2007). 
 DWAF itself also started to support HDIs - reverting to its 
original role of pro-active investor in infrastructure but now tar-
geted at HDIs, DWAF Head Office adopted a policy of ‘Financial 
assistance to resource-poor irrigation farmers’ (DWAF, 2004d). 
This programme enabled, among other, the roll-out of rainwater 
harvesting tanks in 26 villages in four provinces, including the 
Olifants basin in 2005/06. 
 However, for productive water uses, collaboration with other 
line agencies is indispensable. For this aspect of local develop-
ment, bottom-up coordination had to take place through the 
above-mentioned new planning frameworks of the upcoming 
Local and Provincial Government. In order to forge these new 
collaborations and clarify mutual roles, DWAF reached out to 
Provincial and Local Government by organising Provincial 
Water Summits in 2005 and 2006, also in the Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga Provinces (basin boundaries were hardly seen 
as significant). Discussions during the summits on, for exam-
ple, the internal strategic perspectives of the National Water 
Resources Strategy gradually drew Local and Provincial Gov-
ernment into holistic water management. Thus, an ever-growing 
array of aspects of water management other than just domestic 
water services delivery came on the agenda (DWAF, 2006b). 
The separation between domestic and productive uses appeared 
an artificial one, moving towards integrated ‘multiple water use 
services’ (‘mus’) (DWAF, 2006c). 
 The articulation of a bottom-up democratic planning and 
service delivery structure around an encompassing national eco-
nomic plan provided, finally, a legitimate unitary government 
structure. DWAF formulated its sector leadership role ensuring 
the availability of a critical input to these economic strategies: 
water. From 2006 onwards, this new horizontal and vertical 
alignment from local to national level was phrased as ‘Water 
for Growth and Development’. It absorbs the expanding ‘eco-
nomically viable’ water economy and provides an umbrella for 
integrated service delivery, not only for domestic uses but also 
for productive uses and regulatory roles. 
Conclusion 
The many challenges to expand and regulate a sound ‘economi-
cally viable’ water economy receive much attention from DWAF 
and the rapidly growing consultancy and engineering firms. At 
the same time, the large majority of HDIs has yet to benefit from 
greater direct access to water for productive uses. Some have 
even lost their earlier access. Coordination among line agencies 
around Local and Provincial Government to this end appears 
tough. A similar nation-wide temporary arrangement to fill the 
backlogs and cushion the institutional transitions seems war-
ranted. This can influence the pattern of growth. Even when 
such arrangements are put in place, the question in the stressed 
Olifants basin is whether such action will be in time, before the 
very last remaining water resources and affordable infrastruc-
ture development sites have been taken.
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